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ABSTRACT
Federal courts frequently confuse the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
with Younger abstention and preclusion law, often using these doctrines interchangeably to dismiss actions that would interfere with
state court proceedings. For years, scholars argued that the Supreme
Court should alleviate this confusion by abolishing the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine altogether. The Court recently refused to so, however. In
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis, the
Court reaffirmed Rooker-Feldman’s vitality and held that the doctrine
plays a unique role, completely separate from abstention and preclusion rules. And yet these decisions leave a key question unanswered:
Exactly how does Rooker-Feldman interact with Younger abstention and
preclusion law? This Article explores the relationship between these
three doctrines, and articulates two unique roles that Rooker-Feldman
can play. First, Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars federal
court claims complaining of injuries caused by final state court judgments. Second, in the context of civil actions and claims for monetary relief, Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars litigants from
collaterally attacking non-final judgments.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In our federal system, state courts proceed independently of
federal courts—the Framers of the Constitution “split the atom of
sovereignty” by creating two court systems, “one state and one feder1
al, each protected from incursion by the other.” And yet, an inherent tension exists between these two systems. State and federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over many claims, allowing litigants to
2
bring actions in either forum. As a result, a state court loser often is
tempted to seek relief in federal court. These types of collateral at3
tacks happen with alarming frequency, demonstrating that hope
4
springs eternal for many litigants.

1
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). But see Mark R. Killenbeck, The Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1,
4 (2002) (analyzing Justice Kennedy’s metaphor and arguing that “it is simply wrong
to characterize what transpired [at the Constitutional Convention] as an exercise in
splitting atoms, either as a matter of science or political theory”).
2
State courts can adjudicate federal law claims that would be within the federal
question jurisdiction of the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). Federal courts can adjudicate state law claims
through diversity jurisdiction. See id. § 1332.
3
See, e.g., Klaudt v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4091-KES, 2010 WL 5391571 (D.S.D.
Dec. 22, 2010); Gdowski v. Lant, No. 4:10CV3233, 2010 WL 5257010 (D. Neb. Dec.
15, 2010); Dempsey v. Clerk, Supreme Judicial Court, No. 10-12044-PBS, 2010 WL
5283290 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2010); Nali v. Oakland Cnty. Friend of Court, No. 1014844, 2010 WL 5101041 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2010).
4
See Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF
ALEXANDER POPE 137, 139 (Henry W. Boynton ed., 1903) (“Hope springs eternal in
the human breast”).
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Because our system “could not function if state and federal
5
courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular case,”
several doctrines prohibit federal courts from interfering with state
court actions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts
6
from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.
Younger abstention requires dismissal of claims for injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state court proceed7
ings. Additionally, preclusion law rules protect the finality of judgments—claim preclusion bars parties from relitigating claims that
8
were or could have been raised in a prior action, and issue preclusion prohibits relitigation of issues that were actually litigated and de9
cided.
Unfortunately, federal courts frequently confuse Rooker-Feldman,
Younger abstention, and preclusion law, often using the doctrines in10
Several scholars have argued that the Supreme
terchangeably.
Court should alleviate this confusion by abolishing Rooker-Feldman, al11
lowing preclusion and abstention doctrines to stand alone. They
argue that Rooker-Feldman is superfluous—federal courts have no need
for a doctrine that bars claims that also are prohibited under preclu12
sion law or Younger abstention. Indeed, some have suggested that

5

Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970).
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid.
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923).
7
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
8
See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
9
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
10
Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1086, 1088 (1999) (“[L]ower courts have struggled
to define [Rooker-Feldman’s] relationship to other doctrines, especially res judicata
(and, to a lesser extent, Younger abstention).”); Rachel Thomas Rowley, Tenth Circuit Survey, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: A Mere Superfluous Nuance or a Vital Civil
Procedure Doctrine? An Analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in Johnson v. Rodrigues, 78
DENV. U. L. REV. 321, 321 (2000).
11
See, e.g., Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, from the Ground
Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129, 1133 (1999) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine should
be abolished.”); Jack M. Beermann, Comment, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let
State Law Be Our Guide, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1999) (“The RookerFeldman doctrine . . . lacks both a clear role and a clear justification.”); Gary Thompson, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 859, 861 (1990) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
unnecessary and potentially harmful.”).
12
See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4469.1 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2010) (stating that Rooker-Feldman “is nearly redundant
because most of the actions dismissed for want of jurisdiction also could be resolved
by invoking the claim- or issue-preclusion consequences of the state judgments”);
6
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Rooker-Feldman might only be worth “the powder needed to blow it
13
up.”
The Supreme Court recently disagreed. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis, the Court reaffirmed
14
the vitality of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It also emphasized that
15
“Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name,” and
16
“does not otherwise override or supplant” abstention doctrines. In
other words, Rooker-Feldman plays a unique role, completely separate
17
from preclusion and abstention.
However, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on
how these doctrines interact, and lower federal courts continue to
18
19
conflate Rooker-Feldman with preclusion and abstention. This confusion has far-reaching consequences for hundreds of litigants. During the last five years, more than 2,000 decisions have relied on various combinations of Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and
20
preclusion law. Given how often courts invoke these doctrines, it is
Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1129–30 (arguing that “[i]t is difficult to see
what Rooker-Feldman contributes” in light of preclusion rules and Younger abstention).
13
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Foreword, Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Power to Blow
It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
14
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (elaborating on the circumstances in which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies).
15
Lance, 546 U.S. at 466; accord Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 n.11
(2011).
16
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
17
See Allison B. Jones, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Mean to
Be Inextricably Intertwined?, 56 DUKE L.J. 643, 656 (2006) (“The few scholars who find
some value in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine perhaps have been vindicated by the Exxon
Mobil decision, in which the Court demonstrated that it still perceived a niche for
Rooker-Feldman not covered by any other existing doctrine.”).
18
See, e.g., Velardo v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 298 F. App’x 890, 892 (11th Cir.
2008) (relying on prior circuit authority that conflates Rooker-Feldman with claim preclusion’s bar against “federal claims that were, or should have been, central to the
state court decision”); Dommisse v. Napolitano, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (D. Ariz.
2007) (erroneously concluding that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the district
courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims that were not presented to the state
court, if they could have been raised but were not”).
19
Courts repeatedly refer to the “Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine.” See, e.g.,
Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2010); Anderson v. Wade, 322 F.
App’x 270, 271 (4th Cir. 2008); Velardo, 298 F. App’x at 892.
20
A Westlaw search of all federal cases showed that 2,018 cases decided between
January 1, 2006, and January 1, 2011, contained at least two of the following three
groups of phrases: (1) “Rooker Feldman”; (2) “claim preclusion,” “issue preclusion,”
“res judicata,” or “collateral estoppel”; and (3) “Younger” within 20 words of “abstain” or “abstention.”
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somewhat surprising that scholars have not examined the relationship between Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and preclusion law
since the Court’s Exxon Mobil decision, which significantly altered the
21
framework for analyzing Rooker-Feldman issues.
This Article seeks to bridge that gap, by exploring the interaction between jurisdiction, abstention, and finality in the federal
courts and by articulating a unique role for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Part I analyzes Rooker-Feldman, with an emphasis on recent Supreme Court decisions. Although the Court has clarified that the
doctrine applies only to claims “complaining of injuries caused by
22
state-court judgments,” uncertainties remain. For example, it is unclear whether Rooker-Feldman applies to interlocutory state court orders, and whether the doctrine bars claims that are “inextricably in23
tertwined” with a state court judgment.
Part II examines the circumstances in which federal courts must
abstain under Younger. Generally, federal district courts must dismiss
claims for injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with a
pending state court criminal prosecution or an ongoing state court
24
civil action involving “important state interests.” It remains unclear,
however, whether Younger applies only to claims for equitable relief
or also bars claims for monetary damages.
Part III analyzes interjurisdictional claim and issue preclusion.
Because federal courts are required to give a state court judgment
“the same effect that it would have in the courts of the State in which
25
it was rendered,” the preclusive effect of state court judgments varies, reflecting differences in state preclusion law. As the discussion
shows, state courts disagree on many of the fundamental elements of
claim and issue preclusion.
Part IV of this Article examines the interaction between the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Younger abstention, and preclusion law.
Each targets a distinct category of forbidden claims, and significant
differences exist between these doctrines. As the analysis demon21
Before Exxon Mobil, a few scholars offered helpful observations on RookerFeldman’s interaction with abstention and preclusion law principles. See, e.g., Susan
Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1175, 1177–78 (1999); Sherry, supra note 10, at 1090–97; Adam McLain,
Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1555, 1593–99 (2001); Rowley, supra note 10, at 329–34.
22
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
23
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–83 n.16 (1983); see infra
Part II.C.
24
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
25
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996).
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strates, Rooker-Feldman will be unnecessary in some cases, but vitally
important in others.
Finally, Part V of this Article articulates two unique roles for the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. First, Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that
bars federal claims complaining of injuries caused by a final state
court judgment. Second, in the context of civil actions and claims for
monetary relief, Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars litigants
from collaterally attacking non-final state court judgments. Thus,
Rooker-Feldman fills an important niche among the doctrines available
in federal court.
II.

JURISDICTION: THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal district
courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judg26
27
ments, arises from two jurisdictional statutes and two Supreme
28
Court cases decided sixty years apart.
Statutes grant the United
States Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from final state
29
court judgments, and grant federal district courts “original jurisdic30
tion,” not appellate jurisdiction. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, the Supreme Court interpreted these statutes and held that federal district courts do not
31
have appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.
After decades of confusion, the Supreme Court recently clarified
the scope and proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in
32
33
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis.
In those cases, the Court held that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine, confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
34
rejection of those judgments.”
26

See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283–84.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1331 (2006).
28
See Feldman, 460 U.S. 462; Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
29
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari . . . .”).
30
Id. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
31
See discussion infra Part II.A.
32
544 U.S. 280 (2005).
33
546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam).
34
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see discussion infra Part II.B.
27
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The Supreme Court’s Decisions in Rooker and Feldman

A.

The Supreme Court has used the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar
35
jurisdiction only twice—once in Rooker and once in Feldman. Any
analysis of the doctrine should begin with a careful examination of
the facts of those two cases, which “exhibit the limited circumstances”
36
in which the doctrine applies.
In the Rooker case, Dora and William Rooker initially lost two
37
rounds of litigation in Indiana state courts. Not easily deterred, the
Rookers filed an action in federal district court asking the court to
declare the state court judgment “null and void” because it allegedly
38
violated their federal due process and equal protection rights. The
39
district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The Su40
preme Court affirmed the dismissal for two reasons. First, under
federal jurisdictional statutes, only the Supreme Court has appellate
41
jurisdiction over final state court judgments. Second, the statutory
jurisdiction of the federal district courts is “strictly original,” not ap42
pellate. As a result, the Court held that federal district courts do not
have subject-matter jurisdiction to “reverse or modify” state court
43
judgments.
Feldman extended this rule to cases in which the litigant’s appeal
is not as transparent as it was in Rooker. In the Feldman case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied Marc Feldman and Ed44
ward Hickey’s waiver applications from a bar admission rule. Feld35

See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415–16.
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291.
37
The Rookers had deeded real estate to Fidelity Trust Company in exchange
for a loan they failed to repay. Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 131 N.E. 769, 771–72 (Ind.
1921). In the first round of litigation, the Indiana Supreme Court held that this
agreement created a trust. Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 109 N.E. 766, 768–70 (Ind.
1915). In the second round of litigation, the trial court ruled that Fidelity had “faithfully performed its duties as trustee.” Rooker, 131 N.E. at 773. The Indiana Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment. Id. at 776.
38
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414–15.
39
Id. at 415.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 416 (“Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States
other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify [state court
judgments].”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006).
42
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
43
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.
44
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 464–72 (1983). The rule in
question required District of Columbia bar applicants to demonstrate that they graduated from an accredited law school. See id. at 464–65. Neither Feldman nor Hickey
had done so. Id. at 465.
36
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man and Hickey then filed suit in federal district court, arguing that
the District of Columbia court’s ruling violated their federal constitu45
tional rights. Although Feldman and Hickey refrained from styling
their federal complaint as a blatant appeal, the Supreme Court nonetheless barred claims that were “inextricably intertwined” with the
46
District of Columbia court’s decision.
Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts
from exercising jurisdiction over claims that seek to “reverse or modify” a state court judgment (as in Rooker), as well as claims that are “in47
extricably intertwined” with the judgment (as in Feldman).
B.

Requirements of a Narrow Doctrine: The Exxon Mobil Test

For more than twenty years, the Supreme Court offered almost
48
no guidance on Rooker-Feldman, allowing federal courts “ample room
49
to improvise.” The doctrine experienced “explosive growth” in the
50
lower federal courts, which viewed it as a convenient and powerful
51
docket-clearing tool.
During this time, however, courts applied
Rooker-Feldman inconsistently, often confusing the doctrine with pre52
clusion and abstention rules.

45

Id. at 468–71.
Id. at 486–87. The Supreme Court noted that the federal district court had
jurisdiction over Feldman and Hickey’s general challenges to the constitutionality of
the bar admission rule because those claims did not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case. Id. at 487.
47
See, e.g., Rowley, supra note 10, at 325 (“By adding this additional inquiry, the
Feldman court extended the Rooker doctrine from issues that were actually decided
by the state court proceedings, to also include claims that were not litigated in the
state court, and are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state court.” (emphasis added)).
48
Between 1983 and 2005, only six Supreme Court decisions mentioned RookerFeldman, and none of them used the doctrine to bar jurisdiction. See Verizon Md.
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002); Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005−06 (1994); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369 n.16
(1990); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 783 n.21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622 (1989); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481
U.S. 1, 7−8 (1987); id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 31 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49
Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 947, 958 n.55 (2006).
50
McLain, supra note 21, at 1573 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51
Bandes, supra note 21, at 1175.
52
See, e.g., McLain, supra note 21, at 1573 (“[C]ourts are confused and consequently are misapplying the doctrine.”); Thompson, supra note 11, at 880 (“Lower
court interpretations of Feldman have been mixed.”).
46
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In 2005, the Supreme Court finally provided guidance on RookerFeldman in Exxon Mobil, which articulates the narrow circumstances in
53
which the doctrine applies. First, Rooker-Feldman is limited to “cases
54
brought by state-court losers.” Second, the doctrine applies only to
claims “complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments” and
55
“inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Third, Rooker-Feldman only protects “state-court judgments rendered
56
before the district court proceedings commenced.”
1.

Rooker-Feldman Applies to Cases Brought by State Court Losers

Exxon Mobil unequivocally held that Rooker-Feldman is confined to
57
cases brought by “state-court losers.” This requirement should come
as no surprise—the Supreme Court had hinted at this limitation
58
more than ten years earlier. Even after Exxon Mobil, however, lower
federal courts infused preclusion law privity concepts into the RookerFeldman analysis and extended the doctrine to cases brought by indi59
viduals who had not been parties in the state court action.
In response, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion in
Lance v. Dennis, emphasizing that Rooker-Feldman applies only to ac60
tions filed by state court losers. The Court held that the doctrine

53

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Id.; see infra Part II.B.1.
55
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see infra Part II.B.2.
56
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see infra Part II.B.3.
57
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
58
See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994) (characterizing
Rooker-Feldman as a doctrine “under which a party losing in state court is barred from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment” and concluding that “the invocation of Rooker / Feldman is . . . inapt here, for unlike Rooker or
Feldman, the United States was not a party in the state court”).
59
See, e.g., Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 89−90 (2d Cir.
2005) (turning to preclusion law privity analysis to determine whether Rooker-Feldman
barred an action filed by parties who had not been part of the state court action);
Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1125 (D. Colo. 2005) (same), vacated sub
nom. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam).
60
546 U.S. 459, 464. In Lance, the Colorado General Assembly intervened as a
defendant in a state court action filed by Colorado’s attorney general, who challenged the Assembly’s congressional redistricting plan. Id. at 460. After the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated the plan, several Colorado citizens filed a separate action in federal district court, alleging that the state court decision violated federal
law. Id. at 460−61. Although none of the federal plaintiffs had been parties to the
state court proceedings, the federal district court held that the citizen-plaintiffs stood
in privity with the General Assembly and barred the action under Rooker-Feldman.
Lance, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1123−27. On direct review, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment. Lance, 546 U.S. at 467.
54
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“does not bar actions by nonparties simply because, for purposes of
preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the
61
judgment.” Although the Court was unwilling to foreclose the possibility that Rooker-Feldman might bar nonparty claims in exceptional
62
circumstances, it nonetheless stressed that the doctrine “is not simp63
ly preclusion by another name.” Thus, Lance re-affirmed that RookerFeldman generally does not bar federal claims by nonparties to the
state court action.
2.

Rooker-Feldman Applies if the Federal Action Complains of an Injury Caused by a State Court Judgment, and Seeks Review and
Rejection of that Judgment

Exxon Mobil limits the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to “cases . . . complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting
64
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” This statement contains two separate but related inquiries. First, courts must
65
examine “the source of the plaintiff’s injury” in order to determine
whether “the state-court judgment caused, actually and proximately,
66
the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress.” If so,
67
Rooker-Feldman bars the claim. For example, the doctrine prevents a
litigant from suing a state court judge in federal court for injuries

61

Lance, 546 U.S. at 466.
See id. at 466 n.2 (“[W]e need not address whether there are any circumstances, however limited, in which Rooker-Feldman may be applied against a party not
named in an earlier state proceeding—e.g., where an estate takes a de facto appeal in a
district court of an earlier state decision involving the decedent.”).
63
Id. at 466. The Court reasoned that “[i]ncorporation of preclusion principles
into Rooker-Feldman risks turning that limited doctrine into a uniform federal rule governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith and
Credit Act,” which requires “federal courts to look principally to state law in deciding
what effect to give state-court judgments.” Id.
64
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
65
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d
Cir. 2010); accord Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 606
F.3d 301, 309−10 (6th Cir. 2010). “A useful guidepost is the timing of the injury, that
is, whether the injury complained of in federal court existed prior to the state-court
proceedings and thus could not have been ‘caused by’ those proceedings.” Great W.
Mining, 615 F.3d at 167.
66
Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation,
internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); see also Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d
97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009); Skit Int’l, Ltd. v. DAC Techs. of Ark., Inc., 487 F.3d 1154,
1157 (8th Cir. 2007).
67
See, e.g., Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87−88 (2d Cir.
2005) (providing illustrative examples).
62
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68

caused by a state court judgment. In contrast, the doctrine does not
bar a litigant from filing claims that complain of injuries caused by a
69
defendant or a third party, rather than a state court judgment.
Second, Rooker-Feldman applies only if the plaintiff’s claim invites
70
the district court to “review and reject” the state court judgment.
This criterion is met when a plaintiff blatantly requests reversal or
71
nullification of a state court decision or requests relief that would
72
“otherwise ‘undo’” the state court remedy. However, the doctrine
“does not prohibit federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction
where the plaintiff’s claim is merely a general challenge to the consti73
tutionality of the state law applied in the state action,” nor does it
apply in other situations in which the federal district court does not
74
need to directly reject a state court judgment.

68

See, e.g., Klaudt v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4091-KES, 2010 WL 5391571 (D.S.D.
Dec. 22, 2010); Gdowski v. Lant, No. 4:10CV3233, 2010 WL 5257010 (D. Neb. Dec.
15, 2010); Dempsey v. Clerk, Supreme Judicial Court, No. 10-12044-PBS, 2010 WL
5283290 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2010).
69
See, e.g., PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010);
Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 995–96 (8th Cir. 2010). Because some aggrieved state court litigants attempt to circumvent Rooker-Feldman through artful
pleading, courts apply the doctrine to “federal suits that profess to complain of injury
by a third party, but actually complain of injury produced by a state-court judgment
and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.” Great W. Mining, 615
F.3d at 167 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
70
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
71
See, e.g., Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th Cir. 2010) (barring a
claim that asked the federal district court to “order that the proceedings in Family
Court in case number D181580 be dismissed with prejudice”); Lawrence v. Welch,
531 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2008) (barring a claim that sought a declaration that the
state decision “impermissibly impinges upon protected federal rights” (quoting Joint
Appendix at 28, Lawrence, 531 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1026)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
72
PJ ex rel. Jensen, 603 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441
F.3d 1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006)).
73
Carter v. Burns, 524 F.3d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hood v. Keller,
341 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
74
See, e.g., Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293) (holding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar claims arising out of a
state court order temporarily removing plaintiff’s child from her custody because
“[p]laintiff’s child has been returned to her, and thus she plainly has not repaired to
federal court to undo the Family Court judgment” (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)).
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Rooker-Feldman Protects State Court Judgments Rendered Before
the Commencement of the Federal Action

Rooker-Feldman applies only when the state court rendered its de75
cision before the commencement of the federal action. The facts of
Exxon Mobil illustrate this requirement: in that case, Rooker-Feldman
did not apply because the state court issued its decision after the
76
plaintiffs had already filed an action in federal district court. Intuitively, this result makes sense—if the state court has not rendered a
decision by the time the federal action is filed, then the federal action
is not an appeal of a state court judgment, and Rooker-Feldman should
play no role.
It remains unclear, however, which state court “judgments” trigger the protections of Rooker-Feldman after Exxon Mobil. Some circuits
77
apply the doctrine only to final state court judgments. In these cir78
cuits, the doctrine does not protect interlocutory orders, nor does it
79
apply to judgments that can be modified or appealed in state court.
Other circuits extend Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory orders and low80
er state court decisions. This approach prevents federal court plaintiffs from collaterally attacking preliminary injunctions, stays, rulings
81
on pretrial motions, and other non-final state court orders.
75

Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
In Exxon Mobil, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) sued two ExxonMobil subsidiaries in Delaware state court. Id. at 289. ExxonMobil and its subsidiaries immediately countersued SABIC in federal district court. Id. Thus, from the
beginning, there was parallel litigation in state and federal court. When the state
court rendered its judgment nearly three years later, the Third Circuit dismissed the
federal action under Rooker-Feldman. Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364
F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[w]hen
there is parallel state and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by
the entry of judgment in state court.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292.
77
E.g., TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005); In re
Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Amos v. Glynn Cnty. Bd. of
Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that Rooker-Feldman
requires a “prior state court ruling [that] was a final or conclusive judgment on the
merits”).
78
See, e.g., TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591.
79
E.g., Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009); In re Hodges,
350 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006).
80
E.g., Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003); Am.
Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003); Richardson v. D.C.
Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
81
See, e.g., Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
federal plaintiff cannot challenge a state court’s denial of a motion for recusal); Pieper, 336 F.3d at 459, 464−65 (Rooker-Feldman bars federal court review of a state court
order staying litigation); Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473−75 (10th
76
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Several circuits recently have adopted an intermediate approach,
in which Rooker-Feldman protects some state court interlocutory orders
82
83
but not others. Relying on dicta from Exxon Mobil, these courts apply the doctrine if the state court has rendered an order that is sufficiently “final” for Supreme Court review or if the parties have voluntarily ceased litigation in state court prior to the commencement of
84
the federal action.
Thus, although courts agree that Rooker-Feldman protects final
state court judgments rendered before the commencement of the
federal action, the circuits are split as to whether the doctrine also
protects state court interlocutory orders.
C.

It is Unclear What Role (if Any) Feldman’s “Inextricably Intertwined”
Test Plays in the Rooker-Feldman Analysis

Although Exxon Mobil and Lance clarify the scope of RookerFeldman, neither decision invokes Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined”
85
test as part of the Court’s analysis. As a result, it is unclear what role

Cir. 2002) (holding that a federal plaintiff cannot collaterally attack a state court order granting temporary and permanent injunctions), abrogated by Exxon Mobil, 544
U.S. 280.
82
See, e.g., Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1032 & n.2; Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919,
924 (8th Cir. 2005); Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604
n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del
Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 23−25 (1st Cir. 2005).
83
Courts adopting the intermediate approach point to the Supreme Court’s observation in Exxon Mobil that “the state proceedings [had] ended” in both Rooker and
Feldman. Federación, 410 F.3d at 24 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And yet the
plaintiff in Exxon Mobil filed its federal action “well before any judgment in state
court,” final or interlocutory. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added). The
final-versus-interlocutory distinction clearly was not at issue in that case.
84
Specifically, courts adhering to the intermediate approach apply RookerFeldman in the following circumstances: (1) “when the highest state court in which
review is available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left to be resolved”; (2) when “the state action has reached a point where neither party seeks further action”; or (3) when the state courts “have finally resolved all the federal questions in the litigation, but state law or purely factual questions (whether great or
small) remain to be litigated.” Federación, 410 F.3d at 24−25.
85
Exxon Mobil references the words “inextricably intertwined” only when summarizing the holding of Feldman. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 286 & n.1, 291. Lance
refers to the test only when summarizing the district court’s decision. See Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 462 (2006) (per curiam); see also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined” Explicable at Last? Rooker-Feldman Analysis After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2006)
(“[T]he previously prominent ‘inextricably intertwined’ test did absolutely none of
the work” [in Exxon Mobil].”).
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the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry plays in the Rooker-Feldman
86
analysis.
Lower federal courts apply a variety of inconsistent iterations of
the “inextricably intertwined” test, almost all of which were developed
87
before the Exxon Mobil and Lance decisions. Some courts follow a
broad approach and bar any claims that require a federal court to
88
disagree with a state court’s prior determination on an issue. Other
courts follow a narrow approach originally adopted by the Seventh
Circuit and refuse to apply Rooker-Feldman as long as the plaintiff advances “some independent claim,” even if that claim requires the federal court to disagree with a legal conclusion that the state court
89
reached. A few decisions continue to conflate Rooker-Feldman with
claim preclusion, holding that claims are “inextricably intertwined” if
90
they could have been raised in state court.
Many courts have relegated the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry to a secondary role or have discarded it altogether. Under the
Ninth Circuit’s approach, courts must first conclude that the plaintiff’s federal action seeks relief from a state court judgment; only then
can they decide which claims are “inextricably intertwined” with that
91
judgment. And in the last few years an increasing number of circuits have concluded that the “inextricably intertwined” phrase has
no independent meaning but “merely states a conclusion”—if claims

86
By referring to the “inextricably intertwined” test without overruling or altering it, the Court appears to at least assume the legitimacy of the inquiry. See Jones,
supra note 17, at 659–60.
87
See id. at 660–74 (summarizing the various approaches to the “inextricably intertwined” test used by lower federal courts).
88
See, e.g., Parker v. Potter, 368 F. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2010); ADSA, Inc. v.
Ohio, 176 F. App’x 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); Untracht v. Weimann, 141 F. App’x 46,
48–49 (3d Cir. 2005). This approach originated in Justice Marshall’s concurrence in
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he
federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal
claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.”).
89
GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993); accord
Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., 434 F.3d 432, 436–37 (6th Cir. 2006).
90
See, e.g., Johnson v. Baker, No. 08-11589, 2008 WL 4657823, at *1 (11th Cir.
Oct. 20, 2008) (per curiam); McMahon v. Wash. State Bank, No. 05-C-122-S, 2005 WL
1648204, at *2 (W.D. Wis. July 13, 2005).
91
See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ignacio v. Judges
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir.
2006).
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meet Exxon Mobil’s requirements, they are, “by definition, ‘inextrica92
bly intertwined’ with the state-court decision.”
To the extent that the “inextricably intertwined” test survived the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
93
appear to have the only viable approaches. Exxon Mobil’s statement
that Rooker-Feldman does not apply as long as the federal action “presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclu94
sion that a state court has reached,” suggests a narrow definition of
“inextricably intertwined” and is flatly inconsistent with a broad in95
terpretation of that phrase. Moreover, after the Court’s emphasis in
both Exxon Mobil and Lance that “Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclu96
sion by another name,” it is inappropriate to use rules from preclusion law when analyzing whether claims are “inextricably inter97
twined.”
In sum, Rooker-Feldman recognizes that federal district courts are
courts of original jurisdiction, not appellate jurisdiction. The doctrine bars federal claims that seek to reverse or modify state court
judgments, but it remains unclear whether it also bars “inextricably
intertwined” claims as well. In any event, Rooker-Feldman applies only
in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceed92

Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006); accord Great
W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 170 (3d Cir. 2010); E.
Hill Synagogue v. City of Englewood, 240 F. App’x 938, 941 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007);
McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394–95 (6th Cir. 2006); Bolden v. City of
Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006); States Res. Corp. v. Architectural
Team, Inc., 433 F.3d 73, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2005); Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2005).
93
Exxon Mobil cited decisions applying the Seventh and Ninth Circuit “inextricably intertwined” tests, apparently with approval. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (citing GASH, 995 F.2d at 728; Noel, 341
F.3d at 1163–64).
94
Id. (alterations, internal quotations, and citations omitted); accord Skinner v.
Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011).
95
See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 85, at 15 n.64 (arguing that, after Exxon
Mobil, “federal courts should not apply the [inextricably intertwined] concept expansively”); Jones, supra note 17, at 676 (noting that the broad “Marshall approach to
‘inextricably intertwined’ does not appear to survive Exxon Mobil”).
96
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (per curiam); accord Exxon Mobil,
544 U.S. at 284 (“Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion
doctrine . . . .”).
97
See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 85, at 17 (“What [lower federal courts]
should avoid, as the recent follow-up Lance decision makes clear, is general resort to
preclusion law even as an aid in determining applicability of Rooker-Feldman.”); Jones,
supra note 17, at 675 (noting that after Exxon Mobil, “[i]t is clear that the res judicata
approach is no longer a viable option”).
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ings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
98
those judgments.”
III. ABSTENTION: THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE
In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal courts
must abstain when a plaintiff requests injunctive relief that would in99
terfere with a pending state court criminal prosecution. In subse100
quent cases, the Court dramatically expanded the Younger doctrine.
In its modern form, the doctrine protects not only criminal proceedings, but also ongoing state court civil actions involving important
101
state interests, as long as there is an adequate opportunity to raise
102
constitutional claims.
Some aspects of Younger abstention remain
unclear, however. Most notably, courts disagree as to whether Younger is limited to claims for equitable relief or bars damages claims as
103
well.
The Supreme Court’s Decision in Younger v. Harris

A.

In the Younger case, the District Attorney for Los Angeles County
prosecuted John Harris, Jr. in state court, under California’s Criminal
104
Syndicalism Act. Harris filed an action in federal district court requesting injunctive relief against the pending state criminal prosecu105
tion. The district court invalidated the Criminal Syndicalism Act on
First Amendment grounds and enjoined the state court proceed106
ings.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that federal courts cannot enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings, absent excep-

98
99

Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39–41 (1971); see also discussion infra Part

III.A.
100

See infra Part III.B.
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
102
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982).
103
See infra Part III.C.
104
Younger, 401 U.S. at 39–41. California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act defined
“criminal syndicalism” as “any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and
abetting the commission of crime, sabotage . . . , or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change.” Id. at 38 n.1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 11400 (West 1971) (repealed 1991)).
105
Id. at 38–39.
106
Id. at 40.
101
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107

tional circumstances. Basing its decision on “primary sources” underlying the interaction between state and federal courts, the Court
108
invoked notions of comity and “Our Federalism”—”the belief that
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their sepa109
rate ways.” The Court also relied on the basic principle that “courts
of equity should not act . . . when the moving party has an adequate
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equita110
ble relief.” Applying this rule, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred when it enjoined the state prosecution against Har111
ris.

107

Id. at 41. “[S]pecial circumstances” justifying a departure from this rule include repeated bad-faith prosecutions and enforcement of statutes that are “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph.” Id. at 41, 53–54; see also Comment, Limiting the Younger
Doctrine: A Critique and Proposal, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1318, 1328–31 (1979) (discussing
the exceptions to Younger). The Younger opinion cites Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965), as an example of the type of harassment through bad-faith prosecutions
that would justify an injunction against state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at
47–49; see also Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
108
Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44. “Comity encompasses the notion that, based on
judicial courtesy and deference, the courts of one jurisdiction will give credit and effect to the laws and judicial holdings of courts from another jurisdiction.” Mathew
D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal Court Intervention, 28
SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 1115 n.84 (1998); see also David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549–50, 581 (1985) (noting that Younger is “[t]he
present-day heir” to a tradition in which “comity concerns . . . led English courts to
refuse to enjoin proceedings in Scotland, even though Scottish and English courts
are tribunals of the same sovereign”).
109
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. For historical background on the Supreme Court’s
use of the phrase “Our Federalism” prior to Younger, see Aviam Soifer & H.C.
Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1165
n.124 (1977); see also Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our
Federalism”, 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 703–12 (1993) (discussing the evolution of the concept of “Our Federalism”).
110
Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44. Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not base its
decision on the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides that “[a] court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). The Court’s reluctance to rely on this statute makes more sense in light of its subsequent decision in
Mitchum v. Foster, in which the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an “expressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972). Thus, the
Anti-Injunction Act did not bar Harris’s § 1983 claim.
111
Younger, 401 U.S. at 49. After observing that Harris had an opportunity to
raise his constitutional claims in the pending state court proceedings, the Court noted that “[t]here is no suggestion that this single prosecution against Harris is
brought in bad faith or is only one of a series of repeated prosecutions to which he
will be subjected.” Id.
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Although commentators generally agree with Younger’s equity ra112
tionale, they have vigorously debated whether it was wise for the
113
Court to rely on notions of comity and federalism. Paul Bator has
defended the Court’s rationale, arguing that “especially sensitive political nerves are likely to be touched if federal judges are free to enjoin—or to declare unconstitutional—state court enforcement pro114
ceedings.”
However, many scholars view Younger’s reliance on
comity and federalism as misguided. For example, John Gibbons has
115
criticized Younger’s “strident antinational tone,” and Aviam Soifer
and H.C. Macgill have argued that the Supreme Court’s notion of
comity and federalism “reflects an obsessive concern with conflict between the state and national sovereigns,” which “turns out in practice
116
to be a mandate to federal courts to give way.”
Thus, Younger draws on principles of equity, comity, and federalism and prohibits federal district courts from enjoining ongoing state
court criminal proceedings. The doctrine is a powerful forumallocation device—it shifts federal constitutional claims to state

112
Shapiro, supra note 108, at 579–80 (“[C]ourts and commentators generally
agree that there may be powerful reasons to withhold injunctive relief when simpler
and less intrusive remedies are at hand.”). But see Soifer & Macgill, supra note 109, at
1143 (arguing that the rigidity of the Younger doctrine “has eliminated the discretionary balancing at the heart of equity”).
113
The scholarship on this debate is voluminous. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The
State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981);
Fiss, supra note 107; Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 530 (1989); John J. Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087 (1978);
Wayne McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of
Constitutional Claims, 60 VA. L. REV. 250 (1974); Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of
Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978); S.
Stephen Rosenfeld, The Place of State Courts in the Era of Younger v. Harris, 59 B.U. L.
REV. 597 (1979); Jeffrey M. Shaman & Richard C. Turkington, Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd.: The Federal Courthouse Door Closes Further, 56 B.U. L. REV. 907 (1976); Soifer &
Macgill, supra note 109; Ralph U. Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference
with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53
N.C. L. REV. 591 (1975).
114
Bator, supra note 113, at 620. Bator further argued that “[i]f we want state
judges to feel institutional responsibility for vindicating federal rights, it is counterproductive to be grudging in giving them the opportunity to do so . . . . Let us beware of breeding the very attitudes of cynicism and hostility which we fear.” Id. at
625.
115
Gibbons, supra note 113, at 1105. Gibbons argued that the Supreme Court’s
conception of federalism disregards several notable historical events, including “the
Civil War, the fourteenth amendment, the Civil Rights Acts, the federal jurisdictional
grants of the Reconstruction era, and the civil rights legislation of the 1960’s.” Id. at
1104.
116
Soifer & Macgill, supra note 109, at 1185–86.
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courts, even though federal courts would otherwise have jurisdic117
tion.
Clarification and Extension of the Younger Doctrine

B.

In the years following the Younger decision, the Supreme Court
118
extended the scope of abstention well beyond the facts of that case.
As a result, Younger abstention now applies if three basic require119
ments are met. First, there must be an “ongoing state judicial pro120
ceeding” at the time the federal claim is filed.
Second, the state
121
proceeding must “implicate important state interests.” Third, there
must be “an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise
122
constitutional challenges.”
1.

Younger Protects Pending State Court Proceedings

Federal courts are required to abstain under Younger only if
there are “pending” state court proceedings at the time the federal
123
action is filed.
As a general rule, Younger does not bar federal

117

See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1249 (2004) (noting that Younger
“serves to allocate cases to state court consistent with the state’s enforcement interest,
while simultaneously denying access to federal court, despite the existence of federal
interests”).
118
See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal
Court Deference to State Court Proceedings: A Response to Professor Stravitz, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 173, 184 (1989) (“The Supreme Court has extended Younger dramatically to bar
injunctions of civil proceedings which implicate important state interests when adequate relief is available in the state court. In addition, Younger has been applied to
declaratory and other forms of relief.”).
119
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982).
120
See infra Part III.B.1.
121
See infra Part III.B.2.
122
See infra Part III.B.3.
123
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974). A pending prosecution
obviously exists if officials have filed formal charges or if there has been an indictment returned in state court. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)
(“Appellee Harris has been indicted, and was actually being prosecuted by California
. . . at the time this suit was filed.”). Some lower courts have also suggested that an
arrest by state officials triggers Younger abstention. See Rialto Theater Co. v. City of
Wilmington, 440 F.2d 1326, 1326–27 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Eve Prods., Inc. v.
Shannon, 439 F.2d 1073, 1073–74 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). But see Agriesti v.
MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 53 F.3d 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that there
were “no ongoing state judicial proceedings” for Younger purposes when plaintiffs
filed their federal claim after being arrested).
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124

courts from enjoining future criminal prosecutions, nor does it prevent a federal court from granting declaratory relief in the absence of
125
ongoing state court proceedings.
And yet, a litigant cannot stave off abstention merely by winning
the race to the courthouse door. Even when the federal action is
filed first, Younger nonetheless applies if a state court prosecution
commences prior to “proceedings of substance on the merits” in the
126
federal action. For example, a federal district court must abstain if
it has done nothing but deny a temporary restraining order at the
127
time state proceedings begin.
Similarly, a federal district court’s
consideration of abstention issues is not a proceeding of substance on
128
In contrast, a federal court’s
the merits for purposes of Younger.
grant of a preliminary injunction is sufficient to render Younger inap129
plicable.
State court proceedings remain “pending” for purposes of the
Younger doctrine until the losing party exhausts all state appellate
130
remedies. The Supreme Court has reasoned that “[v]irtually all of
the evils at which Younger is directed would inhere in federal inter131
vention prior to completion of state appellate proceedings.” A party is not excused from this exhaustion requirement merely because
132
there is little chance for success on appeal. Moreover, a state court
124
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975); see also Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908) (noting that a federal court in equity may enjoin “officers of
the state . . . who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil
or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act”).
125
Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462–63. As the Supreme Court has recognized, a contrary
rule would “place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting
state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.” Id.
at 462.
126
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
127
Id. at 338–39, 349–50.
128
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 436–
37 (1982).
129
See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984). These cases lead to
an inescapable conclusion: state prosecutors can veto the federal forum if they immediately file charges after receiving notice that someone under investigation has
brought an action in federal court. See Fiss, supra note 107, at 1135–36 (arguing that
the Younger doctrine vests district attorneys with “a reverse removal power”).
130
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).
131
Id. The Court later clarified that Younger requires exhaustion of state appellate remedies only when the federal claim is “designed to annul the results of a state
trial,” not when the relief sought by the federal court plaintiff would be “wholly prospective,” merely “preclud[ing] further prosecution.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 711 (1977).
132
See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 610.
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loser cannot circumvent Younger by allowing the time for filing an
133
appeal to elapse.
2.

Younger Applies if the Pending State Court Proceeding Involves
Important State Interests

Although Younger involved a pending state court criminal prose134
cution, the Supreme Court has extended the holding of that case to
a limited number of state court civil proceedings—namely, civil enforcement actions filed by state officials and private civil litigation
135
implicating “important state interests.”
First, Younger protects civil enforcement actions filed by state of136
ficials.
For example, in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., the Court used
Younger to prohibit a federal district court from enjoining a govern137
ment-initiated state court civil nuisance action. Similarly, in Trainor
v. Hernandez, the Court held that Younger barred federal courts from
138
interfering with a civil fraud action filed by state officials. Although
the Court has refused to make “general pronouncements upon the
139
applicability of Younger to all civil litigation,” the doctrine undoubtedly applies to civil enforcement actions “brought by the State in its
140
sovereign capacity.”

133

Id. at 611. Scholars have criticized the implications of this exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Soifer & Macgill, supra note 109, at 1200 (“The introduction in
Huffman of a requirement for exhaustion of state appellate remedies did not eliminate the distinction between pending and non-pending proceedings, but it expanded the notion of pendency toward the point at which the distinction is insignificant.”).
134
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
135
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 832–57 (5th ed. 2007)
(discussing the Court’s expansion of Younger to civil proceedings).
136
See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET
AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1122 (6th ed.
2009) (noting that Trainor appears to “extend Younger more broadly to encompass all
civil enforcement actions brought by the state”).
137
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 595–98, 604–05.
138
Trainor, 431 U.S. at 435–36, 444.
139
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 607.
140
Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444. It is important to note that Younger abstention only
protects civil enforcement actions brought by state officials. In contrast, “it has never
been suggested that Younger requires abstention in deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or executive action.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.
Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989); see also FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra
note 136, at 1123 (noting that Younger apparently “does not extend to challenges to
completed legislative or executive actions that do not require, or have not yet led to,
enforcement suits”).
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Second, the Supreme Court has extended Younger to private
state court civil actions when the litigation implicates “important state
141
interests.” Such interests exist when civil proceedings “bear a close
142
relationship to proceedings criminal in nature,” or when they are
“necessary for the vindication of important state policies or for the
143
functioning of the state judicial system.” For example, in Juidice v.
Vail, the Court held that Younger barred federal courts from enjoining
state court contempt procedures in a civil action between private parties because “[t]he contempt power lies at the core of the administra144
tion of a State’s judicial system.” Likewise, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco
Inc., the Court used Younger to prevent a federal district court from
interfering with the execution of a state court judgment rendered in
a private civil action, citing “the importance to the States of enforcing
145
the orders and judgments of their courts.” Because the state court
proceedings in both cases involved important state interests, the fed146
eral courts were required to abstain under Younger.
3.

Younger Applies Only if the State Court Proceedings Provide an
Adequate Opportunity to Raise Constitutional Challenges

The Supreme Court also has emphasized that Younger applies
only when the state court proceedings offer the parties an adequate
147
opportunity to raise constitutional claims. The Younger decision it-

141

E.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979) (noting that the “basic concern”
underlying Younger “is also fully applicable to civil proceedings in which important
state interests are involved”).
142
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982).
143
Id.; see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 368 (noting that Younger extends
to “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the
state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions”).
144
430 U.S. 327 (1977) (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604).
145
481 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1987).
146
Some commentators have suggested that Pennzoil may extend Younger to all
civil proceedings. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 848. This does not appear to be the case. The Pennzoil Court explicitly refused to extend Younger to all civil actions. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14 n.12 (“Our opinion does not hold that Younger abstention is always appropriate whenever a civil proceeding is pending in a state court.
Rather, as in Juidice, we rely on the State’s interest in protecting the authority of the
judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
147
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432; accord Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 432 (1979) (applying Younger, in part because “the appellees have not shown
that state procedural law barred presentation of their claims”).
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self mentioned this limitation on federal court abstention. This requirement appears to presume the existence of parity, a concept that
recognizes that “state courts are equal to federal courts in their ability
149
and willingness to protect federal constitutional rights.”
Although the concept of parity has sparked a rigorous academic
150
151
debate, the Supreme Court has repeatedly assumed its veracity.
As a result, federal courts considering abstention under the Younger
doctrine employ a strong presumption that the ongoing state court
proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to adjudicate federal
152
claims.
Even when a plaintiff does not raise her federal claims in
state court, federal courts must “assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority
153
to the contrary.”

148

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (“The accused should first set up
and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of
the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford
adequate protection.” (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 244 (1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
149
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 233 n.1 (1988).
150
Compare, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1121–
28 (1977) (arguing that federal courts are superior to state courts), with William B.
Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 612–21 (1999) (rebutting Neuborne’s argument and arguing that state courts have yielded better results in
the specific context of gay-rights claimants).
151
See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149–50 (1988)
(“[W]hen a state proceeding presents a federal issue, . . . the proper course is to seek
resolution of that issue by the state court.”); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203
(1988) (rejecting the “assumption that the States cannot be trusted to enforce federal rights with adequate diligence” as “inappropriate” (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 493–94 n.35 (1976))).
152
See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (“We cannot assume
that state judges will interpret ambiguities in state procedural law to bar presentation
of federal claims.”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (“Appellee is
in truth urging us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be faithful to their constitutional responsibilities. This we refuse to do.”).
153
Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15; see also id. at 16 n.16 (noting that a litigant “cannot
escape Younger abstention by failing to assert its state remedies in a timely manner”).
Martin Redish has criticized this approach, arguing that the Supreme Court is willing
to conclude that a litigant did not have an opportunity to raise a federal claim in
state court “only in those rare cases in which the entire state judicial process is glaringly inadequate.” Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 108–09 (1984); see also Douglas Laycock, Federal
Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 193,
194 (“[I]n many cases the criminal defense cannot provide an adequate remedy, because the criminal court cannot grant interlocutory, prospective, or class relief.”).
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Although Younger Bars Actions Seeking Injunctive or Declaratory Relief, it is Unclear Whether the Doctrine Applies to Claims for Damages

Although the Younger case involved injunctive relief, the doctrine
bars other equitable remedies as well. In Samuels v. Mackell, a decision rendered on the same day as Younger, the Supreme Court held
that, absent “unusual circumstances,” federal courts cannot grant declaratory relief if doing so would interfere with pending state court
154
prosecutions. The Court noted that “a declaratory judgment issued
while state proceedings are pending might serve as the basis for a
subsequent injunction,” in which case it would “result in precisely the
same interference with and disruption of state proceedings” underly155
ing Younger’s rationale.
However, it remains unclear whether Younger also bars claims for
156
monetary damages. The Supreme Court has noted the existence of
157
this issue several times without resolving it.
Most recently, the Supreme Court suggested in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co. that
abstention doctrines may apply in civil actions for damages, but only
158
to justify a stay rather than dismissal or remand of the action. How159
ever, that case involved Burford abstention, not Younger abstention,
and the Court ultimately found it unnecessary to elaborate on the

154
401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (“[W]here an injunction would be impermissible under [Younger’s] principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well.”).
The Court admitted in Samuels that “[t]here may be unusual circumstances in which
an injunction might be withheld because, despite a plaintiff’s strong claim for relief
under the established standards, the injunctive remedy seemed particularly intrusive
or offensive; in such a situation, a declaratory judgment might be appropriate.” Id. at
73.
155
Id. at 72. Some jurists and scholars have questioned the Court’s reasoning in
Samuels. See, e.g., Whitten, supra note 113, at 655 (arguing that the Court’s rationale
in Samuels “flies squarely in the face of the intent of the draftsmen of the Declaratory
Judgment Act as well as the Court’s prior decisions holding that the declaratory remedy is not to be administered in accord with traditional equity rules”).
156
See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 10, at 1092 n.34 (“The Supreme Court has so far
declined to decide whether a suit for monetary damages comes within the Younger
doctrine.” (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988))).
157
See Deakins, 484 U.S. at 202; Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984); Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 339 n.16 (1977).
158
517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996).
159
Burford abstention, arising from the Supreme Court’s decision in Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), applies in federal court cases when state law is unclear and “there is a need to defer to complex state administrative procedures.”
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 802.
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circumstances in which abstention doctrines might apply in civil ac160
tions for monetary damages.
Most circuits have extended Younger to claims for monetary
161
damages, with the caveat that federal courts should stay such ac162
tions, instead of dismissing them outright.
And yet some courts
have held that Younger abstention does not apply when a federal liti163
gant seeks monetary damages rather than equitable relief.
This
split in authority does not appear to produce different results, however. Even when courts refuse to apply Younger to damages claims,
they tend to stay those claims pending resolution of the state court
164
action.
Nevertheless, an increasing number of federal courts are
165
using Younger to bar damages claims.

160
See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 731. Michael Gibson suggests that the Court’s
efforts to “finesse its way out of” this “major quandary” may be intentional. Michael
T. Gibson, Private Concurrent Litigation in Light of Younger, Pennzoil, and Colorado
River, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 185, 233–34 (1989). On one hand, application of
Younger to civil actions for monetary damages could dramatically restrict a federal
court’s ability to hear cases in which there are ongoing state court proceedings—the
doctrine would suddenly apply to a large number of cases, regardless of whether they
are “equitable or legal, criminal or civil.” Id. at 234. On the other hand, if the Court
explicitly confirms that the doctrine does not apply to civil actions for monetary
damages, “adroit criminal defense lawyers quickly would learn to avoid Younger by
adding a claim for legal relief to their federal court complaints.” Id.
161
See, e.g., Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir.
1998); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 15 n.1 (1st Cir. 1992); Traverso
v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1989); Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406
(11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). See generally E. Martin Estrada, Pushing Doctrinal Limits: The Trend Toward Applying Younger Abstention to Claims for Monetary Damages and
Raising Younger Abstention Sua Sponte on Appeal, 81 N.D. L. REV. 475 (2005).
162
See, e.g., Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2007); D.L. v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004); Yamaha Motor Corp.,
U.S.A. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 603–04 (8th Cir. 1999); Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1076;
Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138–39 (7th Cir. 1995). There is some variation
among these courts as to the proper application of Younger to damages claims. For
example, some circuits “have adopted rules that appear to require a stay, regardless
of whether the specific relief is available in state court,” while other circuits “make
the decision to stay or dismiss contingent on considerations such as whether or not
the relief is available in state court.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 980 n.15
(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
163
E.g., Morpurgo v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 327 F. App’x 284, 285–86 (2d Cir.
2009); Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995).
164
E.g., Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have held
that abstention and dismissal are inappropriate when damages are sought, . . . but
that a stay of the action pending resolution of the state proceeding may be appropriate.”); Lewis v. Beddingfield, 20 F.3d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (stating
that Younger does not apply to damages claims, but staying the action nonetheless).
165
See Estrada, supra note 161, at 475 (describing the “sweeping” expansion of
Younger in the lower federal courts).
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In sum, federal courts must abstain under Younger when pending
state court proceedings implicate important state interests and must
provide an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.
In those circumstances, the doctrine prohibits claims for injunctive
and declaratory relief. It remains unclear, however, whether Younger
also bars damages claims that interfere with state court proceedings.
IV. FINALITY: CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION
The Full Faith and Credit Act provides that state court judicial
proceedings “shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
166
within the United States.” The statute requires that federal courts
give a state court judgment “the same effect that it would have in the
167
courts of the State in which it was rendered” —federal courts cannot
give greater or lesser preclusive effect than the law of the rendering
168
Thus, unlike the application of the Rookerstate would allow.
Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines, the preclusive effect of
169
state court judgments will vary state by state.
Courts resort to two preclusion doctrines—claim preclusion and
issue preclusion. Both require a valid, final judgment on the mer170
its.
Claim preclusion bars the same parties or their privies from
relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in the prior ac171
In contrast, issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues that
tion.
were actually litigated and decided, and essential to the prior judg-

166

28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996). See generally
18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[1] (3d ed. 2008);
18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 4469.
168
E.g., Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985)
(“It has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to employ
their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments.”); Haring
v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313 n.6 (1983) (“If the state courts would not give preclusive
effect to the prior judgment, ‘the courts of the United States can accord it no greater
efficacy.’” (quoting Union & Planters’ Bank of Memphis v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75
(1903))); see also Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 378; Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
169
See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945,
1012 n.335 (1998) (“Recent Supreme Court cases involving state-federal preclusion
have emphasized that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires federal courts to apply the preclusion law of the state that rendered the judgment.” (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235–41 (1998); Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 373; Marrese, 470 U.S.
380; Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982))).
170
See infra Part IV.A.
171
See infra Part IV.B.
167
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172

ment. Although there is much agreement across jurisdictions, state
courts disagree on many of the fundamental elements of claim and
issue preclusion. Most notably, state courts sharply disagree whether
173
issue preclusion requires mutuality of parties.
A.

Preclusion Requires a Valid, Final Judgment on the Merits

Claim and issue preclusion apply only if there is a valid, final
174
judgment on the merits.
Judgments are “valid” if the rendering
175
court had jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties.
A “final”
judgment “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
176
the court to do but execute the judgment.”
An order is “on the
merits” for purposes of preclusion when it “passes directly upon the
177
substance of a particular claim before the court” rather than dispos178
ing of the matter “on a procedural ground.”
Because preclusion doctrines apply only to final judgments, it is
179
well settled that interlocutory orders have no preclusive effect.

172

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.
174
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982). See generally
RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 536–42 (2d ed. 2009).
175
E.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 764 (1986). However, “there appears to be a trend toward recognizing judgments as preclusive in some
circumstances even if the [rendering court] lacked jurisdiction.” FREER, supra note
174, at 536 n.20.
176
Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 419 (2008) (quoting Catlin v. United States,
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. b
(1982) (“[A] judgment will ordinarily be considered final [for claim preclusion] if it
is not tentative, provisional, or contingent and represents the completion of all steps
in the adjudication of the claim by the court . . . .”); id. § 27 cmt. k (referencing § 13
of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments for the requirement of finality in the context
of issue preclusion). But see Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“It is widely recognized that the finality requirement is less stringent for issue preclusion than for claim preclusion.”).
177
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501–02 (2001) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note
167, § 131[3][a] (noting that a judgment is “on the merits” when “it is rendered upon consideration of the legal claim, as distinguished from consideration of an objection to subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, service of process, venue, or
any other ground that does not go to the legal or factual sufficiency of the claim to
relief”).
178
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 687 (4th ed. 2005).
179
See, e.g., Moran v. Svete, 366 F. App’x 624, 628–29 (6th Cir. 2010); Saizan v.
Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. Ct. App. 2010); McMahon v.
Geldersma, 317 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); B & T Distribs., Inc. v. White,
325 S.W.3d 786, 790 (Tex. App. 2010).
173
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There is a split in authority, however, regarding the effect an appeal
180
has on the finality of a judgment. Most states follow the approach
articulated by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (“Second Restate181
ment”) and give preclusive effect to a judgment regardless of wheth182
er an appeal is pending or could be filed.
Nonetheless, several
states refuse to give preclusive effect to a judgment that is subject to a
183
pending appeal.
B.

Claim Preclusion Bars the Same Parties or Their Privies from
Relitigating Claims that Were or Could Have Been Raised in the Prior
Action

The doctrine of claim preclusion, traditionally known as “res judicata,” recognizes that “a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were
184
or could have been raised in that action.”
Such claims are
185
“merged” into any judgment favorable to the plaintiff; likewise, a
judgment in favor of the defendant “bars” plaintiff from
186
relitigating.
Beyond the necessity of a final judgment on the merits, there are
a few other requirements for claim preclusion. First, claim preclusion applies only when the same parties to the prior action—or their

180

Erichson, supra note 169, at 972–73.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. f (1982) (“[A] judgment otherwise final remains so despite the taking of an appeal . . . .”).
182
E.g., Wyatt v. Wyatt, 65 P.3d 825, 831 (Alaska 2003); Patton v. Klein, 746 A.2d
866, 869 n.6 (D.C. 1999); Johnson v. Ward, 265 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Iowa 1978); Bartlett v. Pullen, 586 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Me. 1991); Campbell v. Lake Hallowell Homeowners Ass’n, 852 A.2d 1029, 1039–40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); Baltrusch v.
Baltrusch, 130 P.3d 1267, 1275 (Mont. 2006); Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874–75
(Pa. 1996); Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1986); State v. Harrison, 61 P.3d 1104, 1109–10 (Wash. 2003).
183
See, e.g., People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 161 Cal. Rptr.
562, 568 (Ct. App. 1980); Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141 (Colo. 2005); Greene
v. Transp. Ins. Co., 313 S.E.2d 761, 763−64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Dupre v. Floyd, 825
So. 2d 1238, 1240–41 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam); Petition of Donovan, 623
A.2d 1322, 1324 (N.H. 1993); Benham v. Plotner, 795 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1990);
Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377–78 (Tenn. 2009); Faison v. Hudson, 417
S.E.2d 302, 305 (Va. 1992); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 513 S.E.2d 692, 703 (W. Va. 1998).
184
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). See generally Edward W. Cleary, Res
Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
185
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 & cmt. a (1982).
186
Id. § 19.
181

BUEHLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

582

5/14/2012 12:20 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:553

187

privies—attempt to relitigate claims. Although “privity is an amor188
phous concept that is difficult to define,” it generally exists only
when a nonparty has a significant and relevant legal relationship with
a party, agrees to be bound by the court’s judgment, exercises control
189
over the litigation, or other such circumstances are present.
Second, claim preclusion bars parties or their privies from
190
Courts disagree on the meaning of
relitigating the “same claim.”
191
this requirement.
Most states apply a broad “transactional test,”
under which claims are precluded if they arise from “any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions” underlying claims in
192
the prior action. Some states apply claim preclusion more narrow193
ly, however, using various “same claim” tests. For example, Califor194
nia state courts use the “primary rights” test, under which “the
claimant has a separate claim (and therefore can file a separate case)
195
for each right violated by the defendant.”
Despite these differences, courts agree that claim preclusion
“applies not only to claims actually litigated, but also to claims which
187
E.g., Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1137,
1154 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Household Int’l, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 286 F.
Supp. 2d 369, 374 n.7 (D. Del. 2003); Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d
393, 398 (Iowa 1998); N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 525 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Wis.
1995).
188
18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 167, § 131.40[3][a]; see also FREER, supra note 174,
at 566 (“‘Privity’ is a slippery word, encrusted with historical baggage.”).
189
See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39–42 (1982); 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 167, § 131.40.
190
E.g., Ross ex rel. Ross v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, 486 F.3d 279,
283 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Oregon, 470 F.3d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 2006); Camus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 151 P.3d 678, 680 (Colo. App. 2006); Huffey v.
Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1992).
191
See Erichson, supra note 169, at 973–74.
192
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982); see, e.g., Fink v. Golenbock,
680 A.2d 1243, 1249–50 (Conn. 1996); Town of Ogunquit v. Cliff House & Motels,
Inc., 759 A.2d 731, 735 (Me. 2000); Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 952 P.2d 474, 479
(N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
193
See Erichson, supra note 169, at 974.
194
See, e.g., Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010).
195
FREER, supra note 174, at 543. Howard Erichson provides an illustrative example of the differences between these “same claim” tests:
The classic example comparing the broad and narrow definition of
a claim involves a plaintiff’s assertion of personal injury and property
damage in separate lawsuits, usually following a motor vehicle accident.
Under federal and majority law, the later suit is precluded because the
claims arise out of the same transaction. A few states, however, treat
personal injury and property damage as separate claims and thus allow
their assertion in separate lawsuits.
Erichson, supra note 169, at 974.
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196

could have been litigated during the first proceeding.” This particular
facet of claim preclusion gives the doctrine a potentially broad scope
197
in many cases in which parties seek to relitigate claims.
C.

Issue Preclusion Bars Relitigation of Issues that Were Actually Litigated
and Determined, and Essential to the Judgment in the Prior Action

Issue preclusion, also known as “collateral estoppel,” generally
stands for the proposition that “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is con198
clusive in a subsequent action between the parties.”
As this statement indicates, the requirements for issue preclusion differ somewhat from those of claim preclusion.
Most significantly, issue preclusion only prevents relitigation of
the same issues that were “actually litigated” and “necessarily decid199
ed” in the prior action.
Courts generally consider similar factors
when determining whether the lawsuits involve the “same” issues for
200
purposes of issue preclusion. There is sharp disagreement, however, regarding the point at which issues have been “actually litigated.”
For example, some states give default judgments issue preclusive ef201
202
fect in some circumstances, while others do not.
196
Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F. App’x 149, 153 (3d Cir.
2008) (emphasis added); accord Linn v. NationsBank, 14 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Ark.
2000); Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004); Andrus v. Nicholson, 186
P.3d 630, 633 (Idaho 2008); Longval v. Comm’r of Corr., 861 N.E.2d 760, 764–65
(Mass. 2007); Hill v. Carroll Cnty., 17 So. 3d 1081, 1084 (Miss. 2009); Bain v. Hofmann, 993 A.2d 432, 434 (Vt. 2010).
197
See Gene R. Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1209,
1212 (1986) (“Whether the entire claim . . . was actually put forward in the prior case
is immaterial; what matters is whether it could have been put forward.”).
198
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
199
E.g., Griswold v. City of Homer, 34 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Alaska 2001); Gonzalez v.
Superior Court of Santa Clara Cnty., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 84–85 (Ct. App. 2010);
Tonko v. Mallow, 154 P.3d 397, 405 (Colo. 2007); Robert v. O’Meara, 813 N.Y.S.2d
736, 737 (App. Div. 2006).
200
Relevant factors include the relationship between claims, the overlap of factual evidence, arguments and legal rules, and whether pretrial preparations in the first
action would “reasonably be expected to have embraced” the issue presented in the
second action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982).
201
See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Kest, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 33–34 (Ct. App. 2006); Jackson v.
R.G. Whipple, Inc., 627 A.2d 374, 380 (Conn. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by
Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp., 804 A.2d 180 (Conn. 2002); TransDulles
Ctr., Inc. v. Sharma, 472 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Va. 1996).
202
See, e.g., Wall v. Stinson, 983 P.2d 736, 740 (Alaska 1999); Circle K Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 880 P.2d 642, 645 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Treglia v. MacDonald,
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Courts also disagree regarding the circumstances in which a de203
In particular,
cision on an issue is “essential to the judgment.”
courts disagree on whether alternative findings and holdings meet
204
the essentiality requirement.
Some courts follow the approach of
the Second Restatement and refuse to give preclusive effect to alterna205
tive holdings. Other courts, however, follow the earlier Restatement
(First) of Judgments approach and treat alternative holdings as “essen206
tial to the judgment” for purposes of issue preclusion.
Despite these disagreements, the requirements of issue preclusion highlight a significant difference between that doctrine and
claim preclusion—“claim preclusion bars any claim that could have
been litigated”; in contrast, “[i]ssue preclusion bars any claim based
207
on facts that were actually litigated.”
D.

Courts Disagree Whether Issue Preclusion Requires Mutuality of Parties

As mentioned earlier, claim preclusion applies only to claims be208
tween the same parties to the prior action or their privies.
Issue

717 N.E.2d 249, 253 (Mass. 1999); In re Sandoval, 232 P.3d 422, 424–25 (Nev. 2010);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (1982) (“In the case of a
judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none of the issues is actually
litigated.”).
203
To determine essentiality, courts generally ask whether a contrary finding on
the issue in the first action would have affected the judgment. See FREER, supra note
174, at 561.
204
See, e.g., id. at 563; Erichson, supra note 169, at 969. See generally Jo Desha Lucas, The Direct and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Alternative Holdings, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 701
(1983).
205
See, e.g., Schultz v. Bos. Stanton, 198 P.3d 1253, 1257–58 (Colo. App. 2008);
Dowling v. Finley Assocs., Inc., 727 A.2d 1245, 1252 (Conn. 1999); Caprock Inv.
Corp. v. Montgomery, 321 S.W.3d 91, 97 (Tex. App. 2010); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1982) (“If a judgment of a court of first instance
is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently
would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect
to either issue standing alone.”).
206
See, e.g., Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. La Republica Arg., 830 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th
Cir. 1987); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986); Tydings v.
Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 843 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540–41 (App. Div. 2007); see also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 cmt. n (1942) (“Where the judgment is
based upon the matters litigated as alternative grounds, the judgment is determinative on both grounds, although either alone would have been sufficient to support
the judgment.”).
207
David Gray Carlson, The Res Judicata Worth of Illegal Bankruptcy Reorganization
Plans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 351, 353 (2009) (emphasis added).
208
See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 178, at 723 (“When new parties are
involved, the courts generally have ruled that the two actions do not constitute a single cause of action or claim and thus are not barred by res judicata.”).
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preclusion traditionally adhered to the same requirement, under the
209
rule of “mutuality.” Mutuality prohibits a litigant from “assert[ing]
issue preclusion from a judgment unless she was bound by the same
judgment—that is, unless she was a party or in privity with a party to
210
the initial action.”
After the California Supreme Court rejected mutuality in its
1942 decision in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings
211
Ass’n, courts started breaking away from that requirement, applying
issue preclusion to situations in which a person bound by a judgment
attempts to relitigate a previously decided issue against a
“nonmutual” party—someone who had not been a litigant in the prior
212
action. There are two situations in which a nonmutual party might
want to invoke issue preclusion: (1) as a nonmutual defendant, to prevent a plaintiff bound by a prior judgment from relitigating an issue
(“defensive” issue preclusion), or (2) as a nonmutual plaintiff, to prevent a defendant bound by a prior judgment from relitigating an is213
sue (“offensive” issue preclusion).
The Supreme Court has condoned the use of both offensive and defensive nonmutual issue
214
preclusion within the context of federal preclusion law.

209
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 781 n.196 (2005) (“Mutuality of parties was . . . a consistent and ubiquitous prerequisite for preclusion at
common law.”).
210
Erichson, supra note 169, at 965; accord Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Note, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1380
n.5 (1994) (“In general, the doctrine of mutuality required that res judicata would
operate only where both litigants (or their privies) were parties to the first suit.”); see
also Wystan M. Ackerman, Note, Precluding Defendants from Relitigating Sentencing Findings in Subsequent Civil Suits, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 128, 131 (2001) (“The rationale behind the ‘mutuality’ rule, often criticized, was that nonmutual issue preclusion was
unfair because the party seeking to assert preclusion would not have been bound if
the other party had won on the issue in the previous suit.”); Note, Exposing the Extortion Gap: An Economic Analysis of the Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940,
1943–60 (1992) (applying an economic analysis to the mutuality debate).
211
122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942) (“No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality.”).
212
See generally Brainerd Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 25 (1965) (discussing Bernhard’s departure from the mutuality requirement with
an appendix of similar decisions from other states).
213
See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 169, at 951 n.22 (defining offensive and defensive nonmutual issue preclusion); Note, Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Against States, 109
HARV. L. REV. 792, 792 n.4 (1996) (same).
214
Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (permitting offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971) (permitting defensive nonmutual issue preclusion).
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State courts are split regarding the mutuality requirement.
Many states have abandoned mutuality altogether and allow both of216
Some states
fensive and defensive nonmutual issue preclusion.
permit defensive issue preclusion in certain contexts but do not allow
217
offensive issue preclusion. And several states still require mutuality
218
and do not allow nonmutual issue preclusion. Thus, application of
219
the mutuality requirement varies greatly between states.
In sum, claim preclusion bars parties from relitigating claims
that were or could have been raised in a prior action; issue preclusion
prohibits relitigation of issues that were actually litigated and decided. Both require a valid, final judgment on the merits. As the preceding discussion illustrates, however, states disagree on the details of
several of these requirements. As a result, the preclusive effect of
state court judgments in federal courts varies, reflecting these differences in state preclusion law.

215

See Erichson, supra note 169, at 965–69; E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Mutuality
of Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the
Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3D 1044 (1970).
216
See, e.g., Briggs v. Newton, 984 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Alaska 1999); Riverdale Dev.
Co. v. Ruffin Bldg. Sys., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Ark. 2004); Exotics Hawai’i-Kona,
Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 90 P.3d 250, 263 (Haw. 2004); Preferred Am.
Ins. v. Dulceak, 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys.,
Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ind. 1993); Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 709 N.W.2d 114,
117–18 (Iowa 2006); State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 37 (Me. 1991); Rymer
v. Estate of Sorrells, 488 S.E.2d 838, 840 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); McPherson v. S.C.
Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 376 S.E.2d 780, 781–82 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
217
See, e.g., Campbell v. SZL Props., Ltd., 62 P.3d 966, 968 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003);
Keywell & Rosenfeld v. Bithell, 657 N.W.2d 759, 788 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Goodson
v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 987 (Ohio 1983); Mullins v. State,
294 S.W.3d 529, 539 n.9 (Tenn. 2009); see also Adamson v. Hill, 449 P.2d 536, 540
(Kan. 1969) (“[C]ourts are more inclined to permit use of the doctrine as a ‘shield’
by one not a party to the action, but not as a ‘sword’.”).
218
See, e.g., McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335, 338 (S.D.
Miss. 1980) (applying Mississippi law); E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc. v. Sparrow, 306
B.R. 812, 826 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (applying Virginia law); Leon C. Baker, P.C. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So. 2d 158, 165 (Ala. 2001); Ritch v.
State, 14 So. 3d 1104, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Wickliffe v. Wickliffe Co., 489
S.E.2d 153, 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins. Agency, 498
P.2d 265, 273 (Kan. 1972); Lichon v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288, 297–98
(Mich. 1990); U.S. Cold Storage, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 576 S.E.2d 415, 417–18
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
219
See Erichson, supra note 169, at 965 (“The most important split in preclusion
law concerns mutuality.”).
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DISTINGUISHING THE DOCTRINES

In Exxon Mobil and Lance, the Supreme Court “demonstrated
that it still perceived a niche for Rooker-Feldman not covered by any
220
This affirmation of the vitality of Rookerother existing doctrine.”
Feldman likely will put an end to the frequent attempts by judges and
221
scholars to bury the doctrine. Going forward, courts and commentators should shift their focus to two questions. First, exactly how
does Rooker-Feldman interact with Younger abstention and preclusion
law rules? Second, what unique role does Rooker-Feldman play in preventing federal court interference with state court litigation?
To answer these questions, we initially must tease out the subtle
222
differences in the application of these doctrines. The following discussion examines the most significant divergences. First, the applicability of Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and preclusion law depends in large part on the status of the state court proceedings at the
223
time the federal suit is filed.
Second, these doctrines diverge in
224
federal cases involving nonparties to the state court proceeding.
Third, the doctrines apply differently in civil cases than they do in
225
criminal cases. Finally, Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and the
preclusion law doctrines each bar a distinct category of federal court
226
claims.

220
Jones, supra note 17, at 656; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006)
(per curiam) (“Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name.”); Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that
Rooker-Feldman “does not otherwise override or supplant” abstention doctrines).
221
That said, it appears that some of Rooker-Feldman’s detractors do not intend to
withdraw quietly. See Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 GREEN BAG 2D
317, 317–18 (2006) (publishing a mock obituary for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, announcing that “Mr. Feldman” had died on February 21, 2006—the date the Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Lance—and tersely observing that “[i]t is hoped that
he leaves no survivors”); see also Lance, 546 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court’s Exxon Mobil opinion had “finally interred the so-called RookerFeldman doctrine”).
222
Of course, one difference is that Rooker-Feldman is jurisdictional, while the
other doctrines are not. Rowley, supra note 10, at 332–33. This distinction certainly
has important consequences. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 21, at 1177–78. However,
it does not assist us in articulating unique roles for each of these doctrines.
223
See infra Part V.A.
224
See infra Part V.B.
225
See infra Part V.C.
226
See infra Part V.D.
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Status of the State Court Proceedings at the Time the Federal Action is
Filed

The applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Younger abstention, and preclusion law largely depends on the status of the state
227
court proceedings when the federal court action is filed.
The following chart lists four case scenarios that demonstrate how the status
228
of state court proceedings affects the availability of these doctrines.
Status of State Court Proceedings at the Time of Filing:
Which Doctrine (if Any) Bars the Federal Court Claim?
Scenario

Rooker-Feldman

1. State court action pending; no
trial court orders
2. State trial court interlocutory order; no final order
3. State trial court final judgment;
appeal pending
4. State appellate remedies exhausted

Does not bar
claim
Might bar
claim
Probably bars
claim
Bars claim

Younger
abstention
Bars
claim
Bars
claim
Bars
Claim
Does not bar
claim

Preclusion
Does not bar
claim
Does not bar
claim
Might
bar claim
Bars
claim

In the first scenario, the plaintiff files her federal action after the
commencement of state court litigation, but before the state trial
court issues any final or interlocutory decisions. Younger requires ab229
stention because there is a “pending” state court proceeding. Neither Rooker-Feldman nor preclusion law, however, bars the federal ac230
tion because there is no state court judgment.
In the second scenario, the federal action is filed after the state
trial court issues an interlocutory order, but before the court issues a
final judgment. As in the last example, Younger applies because there
227

See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)
(holding that Rooker-Feldman applies only when the state court rendered its judgment
“before the district court proceedings commenced”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 460–61 (1974) (noting that Younger applies only when there are “pending” state
court proceedings); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982) (“The rules of
res judicata are applicable only when a final judgment is rendered.”); id. § 27 & cmt.
k (setting forth the requirement of a final judgment for issue preclusion).
228
These scenarios assume that the other requirements for Rooker-Feldman,
Younger abstention, and preclusion are met—the only variable is the status of the
state court proceedings at the time the federal action is filed.
229
See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 460–61.
230
See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 294 (refusing to apply Rooker-Feldman because
plaintiff commenced its federal action “well before any judgment in state court”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 13, 27 cmt. k (1982).
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231

are proceedings pending in state court.
Preclusion does not bar
the federal suit because interlocutory orders have no preclusive ef232
fect.
It is uncertain whether Rooker-Feldman deprives the federal
court of jurisdiction in this situation. Some circuits use that doctrine
233
to bar collateral attacks on interlocutory orders, while others do
234
not.
In the third scenario, an action is filed in federal court after the
state trial court renders a final judgment, but before state courts decide an appeal of that judgment. Younger applies because state court
proceedings remain “pending” until the exhaustion of state appellate
235
Most federal courts apply Rooker-Feldman to lower state
remedies.
236
237
court decisions, although a few circuits do not. Preclusion may or
may not apply, depending on whether the rendering state’s law gives
238
preclusive effect to a judgment while an appeal is pending.
Finally, in the fourth scenario, the plaintiff files a federal action
after exhausting her appeals in state court. Both Rooker-Feldman and
239
preclusion law apply because there is a final state court judgment.

231

See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 460–61.
E.g., Saizan v. Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. Ct. App.
2010); McMahon v. Geldersma, 317 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
233
E.g., Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003); Am.
Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003).
234
E.g., TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005); In re
Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992).
235
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).
236
E.g., Pieper, 336 F.3d at 462; Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d
1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
237
E.g., Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009); In re Hodges,
350 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006).
238
Compare Wyatt v. Wyatt, 65 P.3d 825, 831 (Alaska 2003) (judgments have preclusive effect regardless of whether an appeal is pending), and Campbell v. Lake Hallowell Homeowners Ass’n, 852 A.2d 1029, 1039–40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004)
(same), with Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141 (Colo. 2005) (judgments on appeal
do not have preclusive effect), and Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377–78
(Tenn. 2009) (same).
239
See, e.g., Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de
P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[I]f a state court decision is final enough that
the Supreme Court does have jurisdiction over a direct appeal, then it is final enough
[under Rooker-Feldman] that a lower federal court does not have jurisdiction over a collateral attack on that decision.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. b
(1982) (“[W]hen res judicata is in question a judgment will ordinarily be considered
final in respect to a claim . . . if it is not tentative, provisional, or contingent and represents the completion of all steps in the adjudication of the claim by the court
. . . .”).
232
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In contrast, Younger does not apply because there are no longer pend240
ing proceedings in state court.
A few observations can be made based on a comparison of these
scenarios. First, in some cases Rooker-Feldman “does no additional
241
When the requirements of both Younger abstention and
work.”
preclusion law are met, a combination of those two doctrines will bar
a federal court action in all four scenarios, rendering Rooker-Feldman
superfluous. For example, if state officials file a civil enforcement action in state court, Younger protects that proceeding from federal
242
court interference until the exhaustion of state appellate remedies.
By that point, there is a final state court judgment that carries preclu243
sive effect.
Second, it would be a mistake to conclude that Rooker-Feldman is
superfluous in all cases. To the contrary, there are situations in
which Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars suit. The vast majority of state court civil cases are not entitled to protection under
244
Several states do not give preclusive effect to judgments
Younger.
245
when an appeal is pending, and no state gives preclusive effect to
246
an interlocutory order. Thus, Rooker-Feldman often is the only doctrine preventing aggrieved litigants from collaterally attacking a
judgment in federal court while state court appeals are still pending.
Additionally, to the extent Rooker-Feldman protects state court inter-

240
See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608 (holding that a party “must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court”).
241
Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1139 (“If another doctrine (such as
preclusion or the Younger doctrine) would deprive the federal court of jurisdiction,
Rooker-Feldman does no additional work.”).
242
See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608.
243
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. b (1982).
244
Younger prevents federal court interference with private-party state court civil
actions only when the litigation involves “important state interests,” meaning the civil
suit bears “a close relationship to proceedings criminal in nature.” Middlesex Cnty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Not surprisingly,
most civil actions filed in state courts do not implicate these types of interests. See
CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: A
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 27, 31 (2007), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/csp/2006_files/EWSC2007WholeDocument.pdf (noting that of the 16.6 million civil cases filed in state
courts in 2005, 32 percent were contract cases, and 34 percent were small claims cases).
245
See, e.g., Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141 (Colo. 2005); Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377–78 (Tenn. 2009).
246
See, e.g., Saizan v. Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. Ct.
App. 2010); McMahon v. Geldersma, 317 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).

BUEHLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

UNIQUE ROLE FOR ROOKER-FELDMAN

5/14/2012 12:20 PM

591

locutory orders, it would be the only doctrine performing that function in most civil cases as well.
B.

Applicability to Federal Court Cases Involving Nonparties to the State
Court Proceedings

Another area in which Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and
preclusion law diverge is their applicability in federal court cases involving nonparties to the state court proceedings. Rooker-Feldman bars
jurisdiction only when the federal court plaintiff was a party in the
247
state court action; privity with a state court loser is not enough.
Additionally, because the doctrine applies only to claims “complain248
ing of injuries caused by state-court judgments,” the federal-court
defendant frequently will be a nonparty to the state court action—for
example, a state court judge sued in federal court by an aggrieved lit249
igant.
In comparison, courts usually refuse to abstain under Younger
when the federal court plaintiff is not a party to proceedings pending
250
in state court. Younger, however, is somewhat broader than RookerFeldman because it can apply to actions filed by nonparty plaintiffs
when the plaintiff’s interests are “intertwined” with a pending state
251
Such circumstances are rare—Younger is not
court prosecution.
252
triggered merely by similar interests or common counsel. Instead,
247

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (per curiam). But see id. at 466 n.2
(“[W]e need not address whether there are any circumstances, however limited, in
which Rooker-Feldman may be applied against a party not named in an earlier state
proceeding. . . .”); see also Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1141 (suggesting
that the application of Rooker-Feldman to plaintiffs who were not parties to state court
proceedings “would run afoul of the minimal requirements of due process”).
248
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
249
E.g., Klaudt v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4091-KES, 2010 WL 5391571 (D.S.D. Dec.
22, 2010); Gdowski v. Lant, No. 4:10CV3233, 2010 WL 5257010 (D. Neb. Dec. 15,
2010).
250
See, e.g., Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled
on other grounds by Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc).
251
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 345, 348 (1975) (holding that Younger barred
theater owners from interfering with a pending state court prosecution against the
theater’s employees, in part because the owners’ “interests and those of their employees were intertwined”). Some lower federal courts, however, have refused to apply Younger to suits filed by nonparties as a matter of course. E.g., Allen v. Allen, 48
F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995).
252
E.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928–29 (1975) (holding that
Younger did not apply; although the federal court plaintiffs were “represented by
common counsel” and had “similar business activities and problems” as the state
court defendants, they were “unrelated in terms of ownership, control, and man-
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abstention is appropriate only when the federal-court plaintiff’s interests are “so intertwined with those of the state court party that di253
rect interference with the state court proceeding is inevitable.”
The application of preclusion law to nonparties highlights significant differences with the other two doctrines. On the one hand,
claim preclusion is broader than Rooker-Feldman and Younger because
it can be invoked not only by state court litigants, but also those in
254
privity with state court litigants.
On the other hand, claim preclusion is narrower because it applies only if both the plaintiff and the
255
defendant are in privity with parties to the state court action. Thus,
unlike Rooker-Feldman, claim preclusion would not prevent an aggrieved litigant from attacking a state court judgment in federal court
as long as the litigant sues the state court judge or other individuals
256
who are not in privity with the state court parties.
Likewise, issue preclusion is both broader and narrower than the
other doctrines when applied to nonparties. Although neither
Rooker-Feldman nor Younger applies when the federal court plaintiff is
not a party to the state court proceedings, offensive nonmutual issue
257
preclusion might nonetheless prevent relitigation of certain issues.
If the state court judgment is rendered in a jurisdiction that requires
mutuality, however, the judgment will carry no issue preclusive effect
as long as the federal court plaintiff names different or additional
258
parties.

agement”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 n.19 (1974) (“The pending prosecution of petitioner’s handbilling companion does not affect petitioner’s action for
declaratory relief.”).
253
Green, 255 F.3d at 1100; see also Citizens for a Strong Ohio v. Marsh, 123 F.
App’x 630, 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that Younger applies only when nonparties to
the state action “seek to directly interfere” with the state court proceedings); Spargo
v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 84 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Because
plaintiffs’ claims are essentially derivative, this case presents one of the narrow circumstances in which Younger may properly extend to bar claims of third-parties who
are not directly involved in the pending state action.”).
254
E.g., Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1998); N.
States Power Co. v. Bugher, 525 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Wis. 1995).
255
See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 178, at 723 (“When new parties are involved, the courts generally have ruled that the two actions do not constitute a single
cause of action or claim and thus are not barred by res judicata.”).
256
Sherry, supra note 10, at 1095.
257
See, e.g., Riverdale Dev. Co. v. Ruffin Bldg. Sys., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Ark.
2004); Exotics Hawai’i-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 90 P.3d 250, 263
(Haw. 2004); Preferred Am. Ins. v. Dulceak, 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
258
See Sherry, supra note 10, at 1093 (“[S]ince some states still adhere to mutuality requirements, the mere addition of new parties will prevent the full application of
preclusion doctrines in some cases.”).
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Applicability of the Doctrines in the Context of State Court Civil and
Criminal Proceedings

Application of Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and preclusion law also differs depending on whether the state court proceedings are civil or criminal. Although Rooker-Feldman undoubtedly bars
259
collateral attacks of state court judgments in civil cases, the protec260
tion it offers to criminal convictions is much more limited. Federal
habeas corpus statutes authorize federal court review of certain state
261
court criminal judgments, significantly restricting Rooker-Feldman’s
262
applicability in the criminal context.
Nevertheless, federal courts
occasionally use the doctrine to bar non-habeas claims seeking review
263
of state court criminal convictions.
Unlike Rooker-Feldman, the primary purpose of Younger abstention is the prevention of federal court interference with state court
264
criminal proceedings. Although the doctrine requires deference to
some state court civil proceedings, it does so only when those cases
are filed by state officials or involve important state interests (i.e., interests “necessary for the vindication of important state policies or for
265
the functioning of the state judicial system. . . .” ). Despite the Supreme Court’s expansion of Younger, most private-party actions in

259
Both Rooker and Feldman involved federal court claims seeking review and rejection of state court judgments in civil cases. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416–17 (1923).
260
See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1152 (“Rooker-Feldman does no work
in criminal defense cases.”).
261
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
262
See, e.g., Gruntz v. Cnty. of L.A., 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(“[F]ederal habeas-corpus law turns Rooker-Feldman on its head.”); Sherry, supra note
10, at 1101 (“Petitions for habeas corpus are an explicit exception to Rooker-Feldman,
so that lower federal courts do serve as courts of appeal for state court criminal convictions.”).
263
Invocation of Rooker-Feldman in the criminal context usually arises when a defendant is convicted of a crime in state court, and then files a claim under § 1983 in
federal court. See, e.g., Petrey v. Bartlett, No. 09-118-WOB, 2009 WL 2760906, at *4–5
(E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2009); Poole v. Kolomitz, No. 09-cv-01741-BNB, 2008 WL 4829849,
at *1–3 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2008).
264
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1171 (1988) (noting that Younger abstention was “[o]riginally limited in application to pending state criminal proceedings” before its expansion to civil enforcement actions).
265
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982).
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state court presumably do not implicate important state interests and
266
thus fail to trigger the doctrine’s protection.
To the extent that a state court criminal or civil proceeding produces a final judgment on the merits, that judgment is entitled to
preclusive effect. Preclusion law is not limited to judgments in civil
proceedings; a valid, final judgment in a criminal case also can have
267
issue preclusive effect in a subsequent civil case.
There are some
268
limitations to the preclusive effect of criminal judgments, however.
Most notably, acquittals in criminal proceedings do not carry preclusive effect in a civil lawsuit when the two proceedings use different
269
burdens of proof.
Regardless, the main observation that should be made at this
point is that Rooker-Feldman applies more widely to collateral attacks of
state court judgments in civil actions, while Younger primarily applies
to federal actions that interfere with state court criminal proceedings.
This represents a significant difference in the scope of these two doctrines.
D.

Types of Claims Barred by Each Doctrine

Rooker-Feldman, Younger, and the preclusion law doctrines each
bar a distinct category of federal court claims. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies to federal court claims “complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review
270
and rejection of those judgments.” The doctrine does not prevent
litigants from filing claims complaining of injuries caused by a de-

266
See supra note 244; see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (holding that Younger applies only to “state criminal
prosecutions, to civil enforcement proceedings, and even to civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions” (citations omitted)); Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells,
Remedies for the Misappropriation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments
Before and After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 913 (1998) (“Younger is not a general principle that applies across a range of state proceedings. Instead, Younger is a narrow rule of deference . . . .”).
267
See, e.g., Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568–69
(1951); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Stites, 258 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001); Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 302 (1st Cir. 1990).
268
See generally 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 167, § 132.02[4][d].
269
See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361–62
(1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982).
270
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
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271

fendant or a third party, and it does not prohibit general challenges
272
to the constitutionality of state laws. Moreover, the Supreme Court
appears to have reigned in Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined” in273
quiry —as long as the federal action “present[s] some independent
274
claim,” jurisdiction exists.
Younger abstention bars federal suits that interfere with pending
state court proceedings rather than claims seeking relief from a state
275
court judgment.
Although a limited amount of overlap may exist
between Rooker-Feldman and Younger while cases are pending in state
276
court, significant differences exist between the types of claims prohibited by each doctrine. Most importantly, Rooker-Feldman extends
277
to claims for damages, while some circuits apply Younger only to
278
claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.
The circumstances in which preclusion law applies also are significantly different from those implicating Rooker-Feldman or Younger.
Claim preclusion bars relitigation of claims that could have been liti-

271

See, e.g., PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010);
Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 995–96 (8th Cir. 2010).
272
E.g., Carter v. Burns, 524 F.3d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 2008).
273
See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 85, at 3–4 (“[T]he ‘inextricably intertwined’ formulation, although not expressly repudiated or limited, appears to have
been relegated to—at most—some secondary role and in any event [is] no longer . . .
a general or threshold test.”).
274
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163–64 (9th
Cir. 2003); GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993));
accord Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011).
275
See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
41 (1971).
276
It is possible that both Younger and Rooker-Feldman bar federal claims seeking
injunctive relief from a state court interlocutory order. See, e.g., Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that Rooker-Feldman
barred a litigant’s claim for injunctive relief following a state court interlocutory order); Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep’t,
973 F.2d 169, 172, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that Younger abstention barred a
litigant’s claim for relief from a series of state court interlocutory orders).
277
See, e.g., Hunter v. Supreme Court of N.J., 951 F. Supp. 1161, 1174–75 (D.N.J.
1996); see also Sherry, supra note 10, at 1125–26 (arguing that, for purposes of RookerFeldman, “there should be no difference between federal suits seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief and those seeking damages”).
278
See, e.g., Morpurgo v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 327 F. App’x 284, 285–86 (2d
Cir. 2009) (“[A]pplication of the Younger doctrine is inappropriate where the litigant
seeks money damages for an alleged violation of § 1983 . . . .” (internal citations
omitted)); Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Younger abstention doctrine does not apply to a suit seeking only damages.”). But see Gilbertson
v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (noting that most circuits apply Younger to damages claims).
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279

gated in the prior suit; issue preclusion prevents relitigation of is280
sues “actually litigated” and “necessarily decided.” In contrast, cases
barred by Rooker-Feldman do not involve relitigation of state court
claims or issues for a simple reason: a litigant cannot complain of in281
juries caused by a state court judgment before that judgment exists.
Moreover, Younger’s rule against interference with “pending” state
court proceedings will rarely overlap with claim and issue preclusion,
282
Thus, the
which both require a “final” judgment on the merits.
type of claims barred by Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and preclusion law are distinct and rarely overlap.
In sum, significant distinctions exist between these doctrines.
Various scenarios involving the status of state court proceedings at
the time of filing of the federal case show that Rooker-Feldman will be
superfluous in some cases but vitally important in others. When the
federal suit includes individuals who were nonparties to the state
court action, the scope of preclusion law is broader than RookerFeldman and Younger in some jurisdictions but narrower in others.
Younger abstention offers greater protection to state court criminal
cases; in contrast, Rooker-Feldman more commonly arises in the context of civil actions. Perhaps most importantly, each doctrine targets
a separate and distinct category of forbidden claims.
VI. ARTICULATING ROOKER-FELDMAN’S UNIQUE ROLE
With these differences in mind, it is possible to answer the key
question left open by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Exxon

279
Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F. App’x 149, 153 (3d Cir.
2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
280
E.g., Griswold v. City of Homer, 34 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Alaska 2001) (quoting
Campion v. State, 876 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Alaska 1994)); Gonzalez v. Superior Court of
Santa Clara Cnty. (Fireside Bank Cases), 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 84–85 (Ct. App. 2010).
281
See Sherry, supra note 10, at 1093 (noting that preclusion law would not bar a
federal court claim that “seeks to rectify the harm done by the state suit itself” because “the harm alleged in the federal suit does not arise from the same transaction
as the original state suit”).
282
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS §§ 13 cmt. b, 27 cmt. k (1982). In rare cases, there may be overlap between preclusion law and Younger abstention. Many states give preclusive effect to
judgments regardless of whether an appeal is pending. E.g., Wyatt v. Wyatt, 65 P.3d
825, 831 (Alaska 2003); Patton v. Klein, 746 A.2d 866, 869 n.6 (D.C. 1999). Additionally, state court proceedings remain “pending” for purposes of Younger abstention until the state appellate process has run its course. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). Thus, both Younger and preclusion law may bar a federal
court plaintiff from collaterally attacking a state court judgment while state appeals
are pending.
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Mobil and Lance: What unique role does Rooker-Feldman play in preventing federal court interference with state court litigation?
Based on the analysis above, there are two unique roles that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine can play. The first is somewhat obvious:
Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars federal claims complain283
ing of injuries caused by final state court judgments. The second is
more subtle and would require some circuits to interpret the doctrine
more broadly than they have in the past: only Rooker-Feldman bars collateral attacks on non-final state court judgments in civil cases lacking
284
important state interests or where plaintiff seeks monetary relief.
As the following discussion shows, it is unlikely that Younger abstention or preclusion law would bar such claims.
Only Rooker-Feldman Bars Federal Claims Complaining of Injuries
Caused by Final State Court Judgments

A.

The first situation in which Rooker-Feldman plays a unique role
occurs when a state court loser exhausts her state appellate reme285
dies and then files a claim in federal district court that complains of
injuries caused by the state court judgment itself. This scenario undoubtedly meets the Exxon Mobil test, and thus, Rooker-Feldman would
286
bar plaintiff’s federal court action.
Rooker-Feldman plays a vital role in these types of situations because neither Younger abstention nor preclusion law would bar plaintiff’s federal action. First, Younger is inapplicable because there is no
pending state court proceeding—plaintiff has exhausted her state
287
appellate remedies.
Second, preclusion law also is inapplicable.
Plaintiff could not have raised her claim in the state court action because the claim complains of injuries caused by the state court judg288
ment itself.
For the same reason, the issues underlying plaintiff’s

283

See infra Part VI.A.
See infra Part VI.B.
285
In terms of the status of state court proceedings at the time of filing, this situation resembles the fourth scenario discussed in Part V.A above.
286
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)
(holding that Rooker-Feldman bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments”).
287
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).
288
See Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F. App’x 149, 152–53 (3d
Cir. 2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
284
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claim could not have been “actually litigated” and “necessarily decid289
ed” in the state court action.
If plaintiff files her federal action against a defendant who was
not a party to the state court lawsuit (for example, the state court
judge), there are additional reasons why preclusion law does not apply. The requirements of claim preclusion are not met because the
290
second action is not between the same parties or their privies. Additionally, if the state court judgment was rendered in a jurisdiction
that requires mutuality, issue preclusion would be inapplicable as
291
well.
Even if this were the extent of Rooker-Feldman’s role, the doctrine
would be both significant and necessary. Aggrieved litigants file federal court actions against state courts (and their judges) with surpris292
ing frequency. Thus, Rooker-Feldman plays an important role by barring jurisdiction in these types of cases.
B.

Only Rooker-Feldman Bars Collateral Attacks on Non-Final State
Court Judgments in Civil Cases Lacking Important State Interests, or
when a Plaintiff Seeks Monetary Relief

The second situation in which Rooker-Feldman plays a unique role
occurs when a state court loser files a claim in federal district court
complaining of injuries allegedly caused by either a state court interlocutory order or a final state court judgment for which an appeal is
293
pending.
Younger abstention will not bar plaintiff’s federal claim as long as
the state court judgment was rendered in private-party civil litigation

289
E.g., Griswold v. City of Homer, 34 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Alaska 2001); Gonzalez v.
Superior Court of Santa Clara Cnty. (Fireside Bank Cases), 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 84–85
(Ct. App. 2010).
290
See, e.g., Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1998);
N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 525 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Wis. 1995); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
supra note 178, at 723.
291
See, e.g., Leon C. Baker, P.C. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
821 So. 2d 158, 165 (Ala. 2001); Ritch v. State, 14 So. 3d 1104, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009); U.S. Cold Storage, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 576 S.E.2d 415, 417–18
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
292
See, e.g., Klaudt v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4091-KES, 2010 WL 5391571 (D.S.D.
Dec. 22, 2010); Dempsey v. Clerk, Supreme Judicial Court, No. 10-12044-PBS, 2010
WL 5283290 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2010); Gdowski v. Lant, No. 4:10CV3233, 2010 WL
5257010 (D. Neb. Dec. 15, 2010); Nali v. Oakland Cnty. Friend of Court, No. 1014844, 2010 WL 5101041 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2010).
293
In terms of the status of state court proceedings at the time of filing, this situation would fall in either the second or third scenarios discussed in Part V.A above.
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that did not implicate important state interests. Alternatively, even
if the federal claim complains of injuries caused by a state court
judgment in a criminal prosecution or civil enforcement action,
plaintiff may be able to circumvent Younger by filing a claim for mon295
etary damages.
Preclusion law is inapplicable if plaintiff’s claim complains of injuries caused by a state court interlocutory order, which carries no
296
preclusive effect.
Alternatively, even if plaintiff’s federal action
complains of injuries caused by a final judgment, some states refuse
to give the judgment preclusive effect as long as appeals are pending
297
in state court. As a result, Rooker-Feldman could play a valuable role
by protecting these judgments.
Application of Rooker-Feldman to these types of cases would require some circuits to interpret the doctrine more broadly. Most circuits use the doctrine to protect final judgments, even if appeals are
298
pending in state court.
But many circuits have held that Rooker299
Feldman does not apply to state court interlocutory orders. The better rule is the approach used by circuits that extend the doctrine to
300
all state court decisions, whether final or interlocutory in nature.
Such an approach is more consistent with the rationale behind the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and has the added advantage of filling an im-

294

See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,
432 (1982).
295
See, e.g., Morpurgo v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 327 F. App’x 284, 285–86 (2d
Cir. 2009) (Younger abstention does not bar damages claims); Alexander v. Ieyoub,
62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995) (same). But see Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965,
978 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (noting that most circuits apply Younger to damages claims).
296
See, e.g., Saizan v. Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 559, 563–64 (La.
Ct. App. 2010); McMahon v. Geldersma, 317 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
297
See, e.g., Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141 (Colo. 2005) (judgments subject
to appeal do not have preclusive effect); Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377–
78 (Tenn. 2009) (same).
298
See Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (RookerFeldman applies to lower state court decisions); Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals,
83 F.3d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same). But see Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d
1266, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2009) (Rooker-Feldman does not protect judgments subject
to appeals in state court); In re Hodges, 350 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006)
(same).
299
See, e.g., TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005); In re
Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992).
300
Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003); Pieper, 336
F.3d at 462; see also Dustin E. Buehler, Revisiting Rooker-Feldman: Extending the Doctrine to State Court Interlocutory Orders, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 408–14 (2009).
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portant niche left uncovered by Younger abstention and preclusion
law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Clear distinctions exist between the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
Younger abstention, and preclusion law rules. Articulating these differences requires careful attention to the scope of each doctrine and,
as is so often the case with rules that regulate the interaction between
state and federal courts, the details are where the devil resides.
Given the unique scope of each of these doctrines, it is surprising that federal courts confuse them so frequently. Perhaps the reason for the confusion lies not in the difficulty of the concepts, but instead reflects the situation federal courts find themselves in when
they invoke these doctrines. Most federal court judges likely have a
fairly strong reaction to a claim that attacks a state court judgment or
proceeding—they know some doctrine must bar the claim. The certainty of this answer may overshadow the subtleties of the doctrines.
As a result, many courts inevitably use the wrong doctrine to achieve
the right result.
These doctrines are precise tools. An appreciation for the differences between Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and preclusion
law hopefully will go a long way toward ensuring that each plays a
necessary and distinct role in our federal courts.

